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LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS IN WASHINGTON
PHIIP A. TRAUTMAN*

The purpose of this article is to exaimne-the nature of the powers of
municipal corporations in Washington in relation to the powers of the
state legislature. A municipal corporation has been defined by the
Washington supreme court as a body politic established by law as
an agency of the state-partly to assist in the civil government of the
country, but chiefly to regulate and administer the local and internal
affairs of the incorporated city, town or district.' Dependent upon the
objective of the particular statute creating the body in question and
the definition in such statute, the term "municipal corporation" may
include almost any governmental body at the local level, from cities and
counties to school districts, irrigation districts and port commissions.
For the purposes of this paper, the term "municipal corporation" will
be used to refer to cities and towns unless otherwise indicated.
The article will first examine the general governmental relationship
between the legislature and municipal corporations. There will then
be a detailed discussion of several specific constitutional limitations
and prohibitions upon the legislature, a consideration of the judicial
approach to the powers of different classes of cities and towns, and a
suggested method of harmonizing complementary and conflicting state
statutes and municipal ordinances.
GENERAL RELATIONSHIP OF LEGISLATURE
AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

The fundamental proposition which underlies the powers of municipal corporations is the subordination of such bodies to the supremacy
of the legislature. Unlike the federal constitution which constitutes a

grant of power, whereby the power of Congress to act must be found
to have been delegated, the state constitution is a limitation upon
legislative powers. The power of the state legislature to make laws is
unrestrained unless expressly or by fair inference it is prohibited by
the federal or state constitutions. 2 This principle is buttressed by the

rule that where the validity of a statute is assailed, there is a pre* Professor of Law, Umversity of Washington.

Lauterbach v. Centralia, 49 Wn.2d 550, 304 P2d 656 (1956).
Union High School Dist. No. 1 v. The Taxpayers of Union High School Dist.
No. 1, 26 Wn.2d 1, 172 P.2d 591 (1946).
2
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sumption of its constitutionality unless its repugnancy to the constitution clearly appears or is made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt.
An application of these general principles results in municipal corporations being subject to the regulation and control of the state legislature
except as prohibited and limited by constitutional provisions.'
This is often stated in terms that a municipal corporation, being but
a creature of the state, derives its existence, powers, and duties from
the legislative body of the state. The legislature may create and dissolve municipal corporations without the consent of the inhabitants;'
municipal officers have only such powers as are conferred upon them
expressly or by implication by the applicable statutes;' the legislature
may manage the business thereof and alter or amend at will by general
law any general or local law or regulation of a municipal corporation.6
A striking example that municipal corporations are merely creatures
of legislative enactment and that the powers of their officers are subject
to such limitations as the legislature may impose is offered by Misich v.
McGuire.7 Ordinarily courts do not undertake to direct officers of
administrative tribunals or of municipal corporations as to how to perform duties involving the exercise of discretion. In the Misiclh case,
however, a statute provided that a superior court might compel the
performance of duties by drainage district commissioners and, in its
discretion, issue a mandatory injunction for such purpose. Pursuant to
the statute, the court ordered the operation of floodgates in such manner as to prevent the flooding of the plaintiff's land. Here then was an
8 State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs. v. Clausen, 95 Wash. 214, 163 Pac. 744 (1917).
4State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs. v. Clausen, supra note 3. For a discussion of the
legislature's powers in relation to annexation, see IVFRsoN, Annexation by Municipal
Corporations,37 WASH. L. Rav. 404 (1962).

5 Othello v. Harder, 46 Wn.2d 747, 284 P.2d 1099 (1955).
6 Gunther v. Huneke, 58 Wash. 494, 108 Pac. 1078 (1910). The application of the
principles set forth in the text is well illustrated in the area of taxation. The state
government has the inherent power to tax, and since taxation is a legislative process,
the power to tax falls within the legislative branch of government. Love v. King
County, 181 Wash. 462, 44 P.2d 175 (1935). Such is not true of municipalities. Though
the power to tax is necessary to effectuate many municipal functions, municipal corporations have no inherent power to tax nor is there any grant of such power directly by the
constitution. It is for the legislature to prescribe for such power by municipalities, attended by such conditions and limitations as it sees fit. A tax in excess of that authorized
by the legislature is therefore invalid. Great No. Ry. v. Stevens County, 108 Wash.
238, 183 Pac. 65 (1919). Likewise, the grant of such power may be withdrawn by the
legislature, even by implication and even as to home rule bodies. Great No. Ry. v.
Glover, 194 Wash. 146, 77 P.2d 598 (1938). From the standpoint of duties, since the
power of taxation is an incident of state sovereignty, it is also within the discretion of
the legislature to compel a municipal corporation to levy taxes in aid of state purposes.
This is illustrated by a statute which compelled Pierce County to levy a tax for the
purpose of acquiring land for use by the federal government at Fort Lewis. State
ex rel. Board of Comm'rs v. Clausen, 95 Wash. 214, 163 Pac. 744 (1917).
7 24 Wn.2d 758, 167 P.2d 462 (1946).
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instance in which the supremacy of the legislature carried to the extent
of subjecting the administrative and discretionary functions of the
commissioners to the supervision of the superior court.
Legislative supremacy is of course subject to constitutional limitations. Other than specific prohibitions, which will be considered in
detail later, there are two general limitations that have been raised
from time to time in an attempt to restrain the powers of the legislature.
The first is an argument for the interpretation of constitutional provisions as self-executing in favor of municipalities. Generally, this contention has not been well-received by the Washington court. To the
contrary, every interpretation will be made in favor of subjecting the
municipality to legislative control, and though a particular constitutional provision may be found to delegate power directly to a municipal
corporation and to that extent be self-executing, it is unlikely that this
will be applied to prevent further controls of the delegated power by
the legislature.
This is shown by the statement of the Washington court that, "It is
our view that, regardless of its language, a constitutional provision does
not confer upon local units of government the power to act independently of legislative control unless it clearly appears from such language
that it was intended to confer upon such local unit some measure of
home rule."' This statement came about due to litigation involving
the construction of the seventeenth amendment to the state constitution
which fixes certain limits on the taxing powers of municipal corporations. The forty mill limit may be exceeded by a municipal corporation
desiring to issue general obligation bonds for capital purposes if authorized to do so at an election at which the number of persons voting must
be not less than forty per cent of those voting "at the last preceding
general election." The legislature enacted a statute which required
that the votes be based upon the number cast "at the last preceding
general state election." It was contended that the statute was invalid
in that the seventeenth amendment was a self-executing grant of power
to a political subdivision of the state and that the legislature could not
limit or alter the scope or extent of the power thus granted nor alter the
manner in which it was to be exercised. The court concluded that the
grant of power to the taxing district was not self-executing so as to
preclude the legislature from imposing additional restrictions, in view
of the fact that municipal corporations are creatures of the state.
sUnion High School Dist. No. 1 v. The Taxpayers of Union High School Dist.
No. 1, 26 Wn2d 1, 10, 172 P2d 591, 596 (1946).
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An instance in which the court found a constitutional provision to
be self-executing involved article 8, section 6, since amended by the
twenty-seventh amendment, which provided that a municipal corporation should not become indebted in an amount exceeding one and onehalf per centum of the taxable property therein without the assent of
three-fifths of the voters, voting at an election conducted for the purpose. This was held sufficient, without further legislative sanction, to
authorize the voters of a school district to vote in view of the fact that
the legislature had made provision for organizing school districts and
holding elections therein.' The constitutional provision constituted a
direct grant of power to the district and the voters. It is to be noted
that the legislature had already provided for the general exercise of the
constitutional power. Further, in a later case it was held that under the
provision, the legislature might impose an additional requirement, not
included in the constitution, that no general bond election of a city
should be valid unless the total vote cast exceeded fifty per cent of the
votes cast at the last general county or state election."0 This supports
the proposition that the court will not look with favor upon a contention that a grant of power to a municipal corporation by the constitution
is self-executing so as to preclude the legislature from imposing restrictions greater than those fixed by the constitution."
The second general limitation raised against legislative control of
municipal corporations is the doctrine of the inherent right of local
self-government. In most states the doctrine can be disposed of in a
few words. In Washington statements by the supreme court in several
cases necessitate some clarification of the doctrine and the meaning
of the statements in relation thereto.
A few states have from time to time adopted the view that municipalities by virtue of their very existence have an inherent right to regulate
their local affairs free from legislative control. The great majority of
state courts 2 and the United States Supreme Court" have rejected the
9 Holmes & Bull Furniture Co. v. Hedges, 13 Wash. 696, 43 Pac. 944 (1896).
10 Robb v. Tacoma, 175 Wash. 580, 28 P.2d 327 (1933).
11 Of course, a statute relating to municipal corporations which is directly contrary
to a constitutional provision is invalid. See State ex rel. Egbert v. Blumberg, 46 Wash.
270, 89 Pac. 708 (1907), holding a statute, creating the office of county fruit inspector,
to be appointed by the county commissioners, to be invalid as violating article 11,
section 5 (since amended by the twelfth amendment in 1924), which required all
county officers to be elected.
12 See 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAw 64 (1962), and RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 57 (1957).
13 Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
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doctrine. Washington likewise early rejected the doctrine when directly
confronted with the argument.' 4
The prevailing view is that while municipal corporations have such.
powers of local self-government as are conferred upon them by the
constitution, this does not include any implied general restraint upon
the legislature; to the contrary, such bodies are subject to legislative
control except as otherwise expressly provided in the constitution. The
fact that the matter being regulated by the municipality might be
labeled local in character rather than of state-wide concern does not aid
the argument of an inherent limitation. 5
Ingenious attempts to incorporate the doctrine into Washington law
have been defeated. As an example, it was contended that the doctrine
was implicit in article 1, section 32 of the state constitution, which
provides that, "A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is
essential to the security of individual rights, and the perpetuity of free
government." This was held not to be an inhibition upon the plenary
powers of the legislature over its creations." Another argument was
made that in the interest of local self-government a city should be able
to provide in its charter for a referendum by the people free from
legislative restriction. This was not allowed when an attempt was made
by a municipality to legalize pinball machines in conflict with a state,
statute prohibiting the possession of gambling devices.' 7 -Most recently,
the statute providing for the creation of metropolitan municipal corporations was attacked on the basis that properly constituted cities and
towns were thereby deprived of their constitutional powers of local selfgovernment. This argument was evidently based upon an inherent
limitation of some sort since no particular constitutional provision was
cited. The court rejected the contention upon the basis.that the legislature allowed for the creation of metropolitan regional corporations by
the vote of the people affected.' In effect, the most recent pronouncement flatly rejects any claim of an implied constitutional limitation on
the legislature.
The difficulty has been caused by an occasional case which upon
cursory examination might lead one to conclude that the court has at
times applied the doctrine. More careful treatment dispels this analysis.
"4State ex rel. Clausen v. Burr, 65 Wash. 524, 118 Pac. 639 (1911).
15 Meehan v. Shields, 57 Wash. 617, 107 Pac. 835 (1910).
"Wheeler School Dist v. Hawley, 18 Wn2d 37, 137 P.2d 1010 (1943).
'7 Miller v. Spokane, 35 Wn2d 113, 211 P.2d 165 (1949).
is Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 446, 357 P2d -863
(1960).
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The leading case in point is State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Redd,"
in which the court said, "It is not within the power of the legislature
to take from the people of the counties, cities and other municipal
corporations, the right of local self-government secured to them by our
constitution." This can be easily misread to mean that there is an
inherent right of local self-government. ° What the court meant, however, was that the legislature can legislate upon any subject not
specifically inhibited by the constitution. In the particular case the constitution provided that the legislature had no power to impose taxes
upon counties, cities and municipal corporations for county or municipal purposes, a concept which will be more fully explored later. The
attempt to tax for such purposes was held invalid. The "right of local
self-government secured to them by the constitution," about which the
court was concerned, must be interpreted in light of the specific
constitutional restraint.
In two other instances the court has spoken in terms which have
created some confusion. In one case, mention was made of the "implied inherent power" of a city to protect its citizens, in sustaining
the licensing by a city of soft drink parlors. 1 The quoted phrase had
reference to the exercise of the police power under the constitution,
rather than a restriction upon the legislature. In another case the
court compared other jurisdictions and concluded that the state legislatures therein had greater control over the affairs of municipal corporations than is true in this state by reason of the fact that "our cities
are guaranteed a large measure of local self-government by the constitution."22 That the court had specific constitutional limitations in mind
is shown by the fact that it cited State ex rel. Clausen v. Burr," and
Meehan v. Shields,2 4 both of which clearly rejected the doctrine of
inherent self-government.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE LEGISLATURE

Although the principle of legislative supremacy is firmly established
in Washington and although claims of general inherent limitations
have been rejected, this does not mean that the legislature is completely free to act. It is true that the federal constitution has seldom
19 166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619 (1932).
20

For example, see the reference to the case in 2

TIONs 57 (1949).

MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-

Plumas v. Town of Cosmospolis, 128 Wash. 697, 699, 223 Pac. 1052, 1053 (1924).
State ex rel. Case v. Howell, 85 Wash. 281, 288, 147 Pac. 1162, 1165 (1915).
23 65 Wash. 524, 118 Pac. 639 (1911).
24 57 Wash. 617, 107 Pac. 835 (1910).
21
22
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been held to protect municipal corporations from legislative, interference.2" There are, however, some state constitutional provisions
which require extended treatment.
Before considering those, it is to be noted that certain constitutional
provisions place restrictions directly on municipal corporations. Article
7, section 2, as amended by the seventeenth amendment, limits the
tax powers of municipal corporations; article 8, section 6, as amended
by the twenty-seventh amendment, places limitations upon municipal
indebtedness; and article 8, section 7 prohibits the loaning of its
credit by a municipal corporation. In a sense these provisions indirectly limit the legislature in that they preclude it from authorizing
that which the constitution restrains. However, these are not the type
of direct restraints with which this article is concerned.
Mention should also be made of article 11, section 8, which provides
in part that, "The salary of any county, city, town or municipal
officer shall not be increased or diminished after his election, or during
his term of office; nor shall the term of any such officer be extended
beyond the period for which he is elected or appointed." This obviously places limitations upon the legislature's powers. However, the
provision relates to the legislature's powers as to municipal officers
rather than the municipality itself and thereby is also beyond the
scope of this paper.
IMP O TION OF TAXES BY THE STATE FOR MUNIcnIA PUFPosEs

A direct restraint upon legislative power is prescribed by article 11,
section 12. "The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon
counties, cities, towns or other municipal corporations, or upon the
inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town .or other municipal purposes, but may, by general laws, vest in the corporate
authorities thereof, the power to assess and collect taxes for such

purposes."
First, it is to be noted that the legislature is restrained from imposing "taxes." The term "taxes," as used in this constitutional
provision, has reference to general revenues for the purpose of maintaining and carrying on the government where the benefits are enjoyed
by all." This is to be distinguished from a special assessment for
improvements which is imposed upon property deriving special benefits
from the improvements. The authorization by the legislature to some
See discussion in 2 MCQUILLAN, MuNIcIPAL CoRoRA0noS 27-44 (1949)'.
0 Seanor v. Board of Comm'rs., 13 Wash. 48, 42 Pac. 552 '(1895).

25
2

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL 38

agency of the government other than the municipality to levy a special
assessment upon land in the municipality according to benefits resulting to the land to be charged therewith, and not according to value
as in the case of general taxes, does not violate the provision."
The constitution speaks of the legislature being precluded from
doing certain things. This precludes the legislature from authorizing
others to do what it cannot do. The legislature cannot delegate the
power of local taxation to any other than the local authorities of the
locality concerned. It cannot delegate to one municipality or taxing
district the power to tax another or confer upon one political subdivision the authority to levy any kind of burden upon another, unless
the municipality or taxing district so burdened is a part of the territory
in which the larger subdivision may levy a tax for its own purposes.
More specifically, the legislature cannot authorize a state administrative agency to impose a tax for municipal purposes nor can it
authorize King County, for example, to impose a tax upon persons
or property in Seattle for the corporate purposes of Seattle. "
Many problems have arisen as to precisely what the legislature is
prohibited from doing under the provision and precisely what it may
empower others to do. To what does the word "impose" refer? Is it
the levying of a tax, the assessment thereof, the collection thereof
or what?
It was early established that while the decision to levy a tax for
municipal purposes must rest with the officers of the municipality involved, the act of collection need not be executed by such officers.
Thus a statute imposing upon county officers the duty of collecting a
tax levied by a city was held not to violate the provision. " The holding
rested upon the proposition that the levying of the tax rather than the
machinery for its actual collection is more important to both the
municipality and its inhabitants.
The matter of assessment was treated in the leading case of State
ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Redd,"° where a statute provided that
the state tax commission could, upon protest and after hearing, reassess and revalue property not only for state purposes, but also for
county, city and other municipal purposes. The court stated that the
power to tax for local purposes rests solely with the local authorities
under article 11, section 12, and this includes not only the levying of
State ex rel. Conner v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 480, 143 Pac. 112 (1914).
See State ex rel. Seattle v. Carson, 6 Wash. 250, 33 Pac. 428 (1893).
29 State ex rel. Seattle v. Carson, supra note 28.
30 166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619 (1932).
27

28
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a tax for such purposes but also the assessment of the property being
taxed. The delegation by the legislature -to the -state tax commsion was thus held unconstitutional.
'Failure of the court to distinguish between assessment- for taxation.
and levy .of taxes has not gone without criticism. As a matter, of' fact.
m an earlier case, the court in dictum had spoken in terms indicatfihg
the only restriction- upon the legislature was one of' levying a -tax for
local purposes and not of assessing or collecting the tax."' While-the
court in the Redd case referred to the earlier decision, it did not
squarely face the distinction. Failure to do so led Judge Blake to
dissent in two later cases in whlch the Redd holding was applied. 2
Judge Blake convincingly argued that an authorization to the state
tax commission, for example, to fix the value of property as a basis
for taxation is much different from the levying of taxes for local
purposes, to which article 11, section 12 is directed. In the: first place,
equality and uniformity are more likely to be adhieved through assessment by a state commission than by a local commission. Secondly, the
purpose of the -constitutional provision, to keep the taxing powers
within the control and consent of the persons to be 'taxed-as much as
possible, would not be infringed by allowing a state commission to
assess, since the determination whether to levy or not would still -rest
with the local officers. Finally, the mumcipality could 'adjust its levy
to any valuation fixed by any agency the legislature might designate,
subject to the constitutional forty mill limit prescribed by the. seventeenth amendment. These considerations constitute a strong argument
that the Redd decision is a judicial limitation upon legislative power
over mumcipal corporations which is unwarranted by the constitution.
Nevertheless, the Redd case has not been overruled, with the result
that neither the legislature nor its delegate can levy or assess the
designated taxes, but may provide for the collection thereof. Thus
it has been held that the state tax commission cannot initiate proceedings looking to the assessment for local tax purposes- of. the
operating property of an electric light company which is wholly mtracounty; 3 that the power of the state board of equalization to fix the
assessed valuations of property for state purposes does. not entitle a.
school district to use such valuations as a basis for levying- taxes for
81 State ex rel. Seattle v. Carson, supra note 28.
32 See dissenting opinions in Northwestern Improvement Co.. v. Henneford, 184
Wash. 502, 51 P.2d 1083 (1935) and Puget Sound P & L. Co. v. King County, 10
Wn. 2d 424, 116 P.2d 827 (1941).
33 Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Henneford, supra note 32.
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local purposes; and, in accord therewith, that a statute providing
that all tax levies made by or for any school district shall be based
upon the equalized valuation of the taxable property within the district
as determined by the state board of equalization, rather than the
assessed valuation as fixed by the proper local authorities, violates
article 11, section 12."
There are limits to the Redd doctrine. While the state cannot make
an assessment for local purposes, an assessment made by the county
assessor may be, and is, the basis for a valid levy by cities, towns and
other municipal corporations within the county.3" An even greater
encroachment upon the Redd opinion is represented by State ex rel.
King County v. State Tax Comm'n,,7 holding that a statute giving
the state tax commission appellate and revisory powers in review of
proceedings of county boards of equalization on appeals presented by
interested parties did not violate the constitution. The Redd case
was distinguished in that there the tax commission, upon its own
motion and after the original taxing process had been completed and
appeals had been taken to the courts, undertook summarily to reassess
individual properties. In line with the later opinion is Schneidmiller
& Faires, Inc. v. Farr," sustaining a statute which allowed the state
tax commission to require a county board of equalization to reconvene
for the purpose of reassessing local property. The court stated broadly
that,
[T]he mere regulation by the tax commission of local boards of
equalization in ministerial matters, which does not reduce the board
to a rubber stamp by dictating the detailed results of the board's
action, does not violate the spirit of the 'home rule' provision of the
constitution and does not constitute taxation of local property for
local purposes. 9
The legislature is prohibited from imposing taxes for "county, city,
town, or other municipal purposes." Insofar as the tax relates to a
state purpose, the provision is not applicable. Thus the state in
assessing and levying taxes for state purposes is not bound by the
valuations as determined by county officers for local purposes."0
State ex rel. Tacoma School Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P2d 638 (1934).
35 Clark v. Seiber, 48 Wn.2d 783, 296 P.2d 680 (1956).
36 Opportunity Township v. Kingsland, 194 Wash. 229, 77 P2d 793 (1938) ; Clark v.
Seiber, supra note 35.
37 174 Wash. 668, 26 P.2d 80 (1933).
38 56 Wn.2d 891, 355 P2d 824 (1960). This constituted an overruling of State
ex rel. Yakima Amusement Co. v. Yakima County, 192 Wash. 179, 73 P.2d 759 (1937).
39 56 Wn.2d at 896, 355 P.2d at 827 (1960).
40 State ex rel. Showalter v. Cook, 175 Wash. 364, 27 P.2d 1075 (1933).
34
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A leading case concerning purposes falling within the prohibition
is Hindman v. Boyd,4 1 in which it was stated that the provision relates
to the imposition of taxes concerning ordinary corporate affairs incidental to the existence of the organized corporation. It. was held that
a statute requiring municipal authorities to submit to a vote of the
people a charter amendment when petitioned so to do by fifteen per
cent of the qualified voters of the city, thereby compelling the city
to incur the expense of such election, did not violate article 11,, section
12. This was not an ordinary corporate affair and to hold to the
contrary would place it within the power of the corporate officers to
perpetually prevent the people from amending their own charter. A
somewhat comparable statute levying a state poll tax, one-fifth of
which was retained by the counties collecting the same to be applied to
their current expenses, was held not to violate the constitution."2 The
tax was not imposed for county purposes. As to the four-fifths going
into the state treasury, there was no question. As to the one-fifth
retained by the counties, this was found to be simply reimbursement
for the cost of collecting the tax.
To the extent that the municipal corporation is acting as an agent
of the state, it may be compelled to tax. Municipalities are guaranteed
the right to carry on their strictly domestic or municipal business in
their own way without interference from the state. However, in
matters which do not concern the inhabitants of the municipality alone,
the municipalities are acting as agents of the state and are subject to
compulsion. Thus, a statute providing for a state bureau of inspection
to secure a uniform system of accounts, empowered to make examination of such local municipalities, was held not to violate the constitution."8 The purpose of the system of accounting was to detect and
prevent the commission of crime; i.e., embezzlement, and the consequent loss to the public of public funds, which was found to be a
matter affecting the state at large and within its police power to control. The municipality was an agent of the state in carrying out the
provisions of the state policy and in apportioning the expenses thereof.
Other instances of local subdivisions acting as agents of the state
so as to justify the compulsion of taxation without violating the constitution include a statute requiring Pierce County to acquire land for
a federal army post, in aid of the general public defense; " a statute
4142 Wash. 17, 84 Pac. 609 (1906).
Nipges v. Thorton, 119 Wash. 464, 206 Pac. 17 (1922). 48 State ex rel. Clausen v. Burr, 65 Wash. 524, 118 Pac. 639 (1911).
44 State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs. v. Clausen, 95 Wash. 214, 163 Pac. 744 (1917).

42
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requiring counties from which harmless indigent insane are committed
to the state mental hospital to pay the cost of their care;'* a statute
authorizing county commissioners in counties of the first class to
increase salaries of superior court judges at the sole expense of the
county;," and a statute fixing the amount to be raised by counties for
school purposes, since education is a state purpose as well as a county
and local purpose." However, as noted before, since school district
taxes are, in part at least, imposed to pay indebtedness incurred for
strictly school district purposes, the levies must be based upon the
valuations fixed by the local authorities and not upon those valuations
as equalized by the state board of equalization, in the absence of any
attempt to segregate between state and local purposes.4 8
What types of purposes fall within the constitutional provision
wherein the legislature is precluded from acting? Instances that
readily come to mind are the imposition of taxes for building city halls,
erecting and operating light plants or gas works, constructing sewers,
and bringing water into the city. These are ordinary corporate affairs
which are for the sole benefit and enjoyment of the municipality and
its inhabitants. These are the areas in which the constitutional provision directs that the legislature is not to infringe in imposing taxes.
This does not mean that municipal corporations are free of all legislative control insofar as taxation for municipal purposes is concerned.
To the contrary, the constitution says the legislature "may, by general
laws, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, the power to assess and
collect taxes for such purposes."" The constitution does not grant the
power to tax to municipal corporations but leaves it to be vested by
the legislature. This enables the legislature to affect municipal taxation
either in withholding the power in certain instances or in granting it
subject to conditions and limitations." 9 The legislature has been sustained, for example, in setting the rate of taxation and allocating the
proceeds to specified funds5 ' and in regulating the imposition of penalties and interest on unpaid taxes. 2 A statute authorizing tax levies
already made by cities, beyond the legal limit, does not violate the
provision since it does not impose a tax but validates an imposition
45 State v. Pierce County, 132 Wash. 155, 231 Pac. 801 (1925).
46

47
48
49
50
51
52

In re Salary of Superior Court Judges, 82 Wash. 623, 144 Pac. 929 (1914).
Newman v. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 50 P.2d 36 (1935).
Clark v. Seiber, 48 Wn2d 783, 296 P.2d 680 (1956).
Art. 11, § 12.
Great No. Ry. v. Stevens County, 108 Wash. 238, 183 Pac. 65 (1919).
State ex rel. School Dist. v. Clark County, 177 Wash. 314, 31 P.2d 897 (1934).
New Whatcom v. Roeder, 22 Wash. 570, 61 Pac. 767 (1900).
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which has already been made by the cities themselves." Here again
control by the legislature is obviously present in its power to withhold
validation.
The possibility of the legislature affecting municipal taxation is. also
illustrated by its power to authorize certain acts of a municipality
upon condition that if the municipality undertakes such acts it must
tax to pay for them. In such an instance it is the municipality which
decides whether or not to act and thus whether or not to tax. Examples
are an enactment by the legislature authorizing drainage districts to
undertake investigations to determine whether to make improvements
upon condition that levies be made to pay for the cost of this preliminary expense;" a provision authorizing the creation of metropolitan
municipal corporations upon condition that a tax be imposed to carry
out the purposes of the corporation; 55 and a statute authorizing municipal corporations to provide for local improvement districts in the
future on condition that a local improvement guaranty fund be
established to be paid for out of a general tax upon property in the
municipality." The critical factor in each of these cases was that the
municipality was free to act and was not obligated to impose a tax.
In contrast would be a statute requiring that a tax be levied upon
property in a municipal corporation to establish a local improvement
guaranty fund for improvements already ordered. In such an instance
the municipality would have no free choice in imposing the tax and
the constitution would be violated.5
UNIFoRMITY OF TAXATION

Another limitation upon the legislature's power in relation to taxation by municipal corporations is stated in article 7, section 9. "For
all corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with
authority to assess and collect taxes and such taxes shall be uniform
in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body
levying the same."5 "
Implicit in this provision, as in article 11, section 12, is the fact that
53 Owings v. Olympia, 88 Wash. 289, 152 Pac. 1019 (1915).
5
4 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Pierce County, 51 Wash. 12, 97 Pac. 1099 (1908).

55

Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 446, 357 P2d 863
(1960).

56 Hallahan v. Port Angeles, 161 Wash. 353, 297 Pac. 149 (1931).
Longview Co. v. Lynn, 6 Wn2d 507, 108 P.2d 365 (1940).
58 Art. 7, § 9 also provides, "The legislature may vest the corporate authorities of
cities, towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessments, or by special taxation of property benefited" This has created no particular
problem in the sense of a limitation upon legislative power. The subject of special
assessments by municipal corporations in itself is beyond the scope of this article.
57
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municipal corporations have no inherent power of taxation nor is such
power granted to them by the constitution. Rather, the power is dependent upon legislative grant, subject to certain restrictions."
In the first place, any authorization to a municipal corporation to
tax must be for a "corporate" purpose. In actual practice this has not
severely limited either the legislature or the municipal corporations
because of the broad definition given to "corporate purposes." They
are,
"such purposes as are germane to the objects of the welfare of the
municipality or at least have a legitimate connection with those objects
and a manifest relation thereto. .

.

. [A] tax for a corporate purpose

is one to be expended to promote the general prosperity and welfare
of the municipality which levies it."'' 0
The requirement of a corporate purpose imposes the limitation that
in authorizing a levy to be made, the legislature must in some manner
clearly express the purpose."'
The second restriction stated in the provision is that an authorization
must provide for "uniform" taxes. An example of the type of tax
prohibited is an early case declaring unconstitutional a statute prescribing a scale of fees, based upon the valuation of the estate, to be
paid to the clerk of the court upon filing the first papers in probate.
The court concluded that the scale of fees had no relation to the
services performed by the clerk. The fee, which was to be paid into
the general fund of the county, was held to be in the nature of a
property tax upon estates, which tax was not imposed upon other like
property in the jurisdiction. Since a tax was placed upon some property, but not upon that of a similar character, the requirement of uniformity was held not to have been met.62
A better understanding of the meaning of the uniformity requirement in taxation is obtained by noting those things that do not fall
within the provision. The requirement of the payment of a standard
fee, not based upon the valuation of property involved, does not violate the provision if the fee is imposed to pay for services rendered,
rather than for revenue.6" Uniformity is not required as to local
improvement assessments as contrasted with taxation for general
59 Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wn.2d 347, 178 P.2d
351 (1947) ; Great No. Ry. v. Stevens County, 108 Wash. 238, 183 Pac. 65 (1919).
60 Denman v. Tacoma, 170 Wash. 406, 407, 16 P.2d 596, 597 (1932).
"I Weyerhauser Timber Co. v. Roessler, 2 Wn.2d 304, 97 P.2d 1070 (1940).
62 State ex rel. Nettleton v. Case, 39 Wash. 177, 81 Pac. 554 (1905).
63 State ex rel. Lindsey v. Derbyshire, 79 Wash. 227, 140 Pac. 540 (1914).
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corporate purposes." Uniformity applies only as to taxation of persons
and property. It has been held not to relate to a tax on trades, professions and occupations, 5 or a license tax under the police power,"
or a tax on privileges such as a requirement that peddlers pay a certain
7
fee.

Even as to persons and property, there is the usual qualification
that classification is permissible. In an early case the court held a
statute unconstitutional which provided that cities of the third class
might levy an annual street poll tax upon male inhabitants between
certain ages, but exempting members of volunteer fire companies. 8
The statute, and the ordinance thereunder providing for the levy, were
held to violate the uniformity requirement since the classification based
upon age and sex was not reasonable. A comparable statute exempting
females and minors was later sustained and the earlier case overruled. 8 The court decided that the exempted classes would often lack
the ability to pay and the burden of paying the tax for the entire
household would fall on the head of the family. More importantly, the
tenor of the opinion suggests an allowance of considerable discretion
by the legislature in providing for classification under the uniformity
clause.
The conclusion may be drawn that the legislature retains much
control over the tax powers of municipal corporations, subject to the
broad, generally not too stringent, limitations of "corporate purposes"
and "uniformity."
SPECIAL LEGISLATION

Article 2, section 28, prohibits the legislature from enacting special
or private laws in certain instances. Several of the subdivisions relate
to the legislature's power with respect to municipal corporations. Be64 Smith v. Seattle, 25 Wash. 300, 65 Pac. 612 (1901).
05 Fleetwood v. Read, 21 Wash. 547, 58 Pac. 665 (1899).
66
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 172 Wash. 649, 21 P.2d 721 (1933).
87
Town of Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217 Pac. 502 (1923).
a8
State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 77 Pac. 961 (1904).
89
Town of Tekoa v. Reilly, 47 Wash. 202, 91 Pac. 769 (1907).
70
Another constitutional limitation relating to taxation is set forth in the fourteenth
amendment to the state constitution. "Property of... counties, school districts and other
municipal corporations ... shall be exempt from taxation." This places a restriction
upon state taxation of municipal corporations. It does not, however, relate to the
exercise of the tax power by the municipal corporations themselves, as do art. 11, § 12
and art. 7, § 9, and is thus beyond the scope of this paper. A leading case interpreting
the provision is-Puget Sound P. & L. Co. v. Cowlitz County, 38 Wn.2d 907, 234 P.2d
506 (1951), holding the exemption provision to be self-executing and applicable to real
and personal property of municipal corporations.
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fore considering these, a general analysis of the restriction upon special
legislation is needed.
Provisions restrictive of special legislation have as their purpose
preventing particular cities from being specially favored or specially
discriminated against by the legislature. They may be regarded as
the equivalent of the equal protection of the laws clauses which are
applicable to individuals and private corporations.
The purpose of such provisions, to obtain uniformity and equality,
is desirable. The difficulty is one of definition in ascertaining what
is a special law and what a general law on a subject. The Washington
court has stated:
The authorities are in substantial harmony upon the rule by which a
law is to be tested to determine whether it is general or special. A
special law is one which relates to particular persons or things, while
a general law is one which applies to all persons or things of a class.
A law is general when it operates upon all persons or things constituting a class, even though such class consists of but one person or
thing; but the law must be so framed that all persons or things constituting the class come within its provisions.7'1
Though the authorities may be in "substantial harmony" upon the
rule, they are not so upon its application. One thing is clear, however,
and that is that a prohibition of special legislation does not mean
classification is not permissible. By its very nature all legislation is
necessarily based on a classification of some kind since no piece of
legislation can relate to all things.
In determining whether a particular classification is valid, a test
of reasonableness is imposed. This is dependent upon two basic considerations. First, do the different classes established by the legislature possess different characteristics? Secondly, do the different
characteristics relate to the purpose and subject matter of the legislation?72
As an example of the application of the two considerations, the legislature might enact a statute providing that in cities with a population
of 5,000 or more there should be a fire department with personnel
always on duty, while in cities under 5,000 a voluntary department
would be sufficient. This classification might well be sustained on the
basis that the different characteristics of the two classes; i.e., size of
71

Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Seattle v. Parish, 89 Wash. 495, 497, 154 Pac. 785

(1916).
72

State ex rel. Lindsey v. Derbyshire, 79 Wash. 227, 140 Pac. 540 (1914).
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population, relate to the purpose of the statute; i.e., obtaining adequate
fire protection. In view of the cost of employing permanent firemen,
the greater likelihood of fires starting and spreading more rapidly in
areas of larger and more concentrated population, and the greater
ease of getting to the fire station in a smaller community, the classification might well be reasonable.
On the other hand, if the legislature were to enact a statute allowing
the operation of pinball machines in cities over 5,000, but prohibiting
them in smaller communities, the classification might be held invalid.
While the different characteristics would be present as in the preceding example; i.e., size of population, they would seem to have no
relevance to the subject matter of the legislation. The operation of
pinball machines is not likely to be more violative of public morality
or general welfare in smaller towns than in larger communities.
The allowance of a classification if based upon substantially different
characteristics and if reasonably related to the purpose of the legislative enactment is usually buttressed by the recognition of a broad
discretion in the legislature to classify."s The recognition of such discretion and the application of the tests discussed is evidenced by two
Washington cases.
The legislature required the appointment of an official court stenographer in every county having a population of over 30,000 inhabitants,
but excepted counties having a population of over 200,000. This was
attacked as being invalid class legislation. The court first noted that
differences in poulation may well justify different laws. While it is
difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between 29,999 and 30,000
or 199,999 and 200,000, the legislature must be allowed to draw a
line at some point and it is the general grouping that is of consequence.
The court.was also able to discern that the differences in population
related to the purpose of the legislation. Courts in counties of small
population might be able to conduct their business without any
stenographer, whereas larger counties would require such services.
This justified the exception of counties under 30,000. In counties of
the intermediate class, there might -not be sufficient private employment to engage the attention of a competent stenographer, rendering
it difficult and costly to obtain one when the necessity arose, which
difficulty was overcome by providing a stenographer constant public
employment. In the larger counties of over 200,000 population, competent stenographers might always be within reach thereby eliminating
the necessity of permanent public employment. This was supported
7

3

Campbell v. State, 12 Wn.2d 459, 122 P.2d 458 (1942).
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by a recognition that other reasons might have persuaded the legislature to classify and this was within its discretion. "
The second case involved a statute extending the boundaries of all
cities to the middle of navigable waters adjacent to their boundaries.
This was held to be valid class legislation." Clearly, cities bordering
on water have different characteristics than those that do not. Also,
the need for such cities to regulate certain activities upon the adjacent
waters and thus the need to extend their boundaries, relates to the
characteristics which distinguish such cities from others. Both tests
are thus met. This is to be contrasted with a statute which might allow
the regulation of liquor sales by cities bordering navigable water, but
not by others. Such might be invalid as special legislation, for although
there would be different characteristics in the two classes, they would
not relate to the purposes of the legislation.
With these general considerations in mind, it is now possible to
examine those subdivisions of the constitutional provision which particularly relate to municipal corporations. This is necessary since in
the absence of specific constitutional prohibition, the enactment of
special laws is within the power of the legislature."6 Article 2, section
28, subdivision 6, prohibits special legislation, "For granting corporate
powers or privileges." It was early decided that this subdivision relates
to powers conferred upon municipal as well as private corporations."
Two cases illustrate the application of the provision. A statute
authorized the counties of King, Pierce and Spokane to create an
indebtedness for the purpose of acquiring sites for, and the construction of, state armories. There was no attempt to specify a class, and in
view of the purpose of the act, doubt was expressed that a classification
could be devised which would be relevant to the subject matter. The
designation of the three counties was held to be a special grant of
corporate powers prohibited by the constitution." A comparable case
involved a statute authorizing Pierce County to incur an indebtedness
for the purpose of acquiring land for use by the federal government.
This was sustained on the basis that the county was acting for a state
purpose rather than a county purpose. In effect, the county was
74 State ex rel. Vance v. Frater, 84 Wash. 466, 147 Pac. 25 (1915).
75 Pacific American Fisheries v. Whatcom County, 69 Wash. 291, 124 Pac. 905
(1912).
76 Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wn.2d 211, 163 P.2d 594 (1945).
77 Terry v. King County, 43 Wash. 61, 86 Pac. 210 (1906). The provision does not
apply to state agencies. State ex rel. Tattersall v. Yelle, 52 Wn.2d 856, 329 P.2d 841
(1958) ; Robison v. Dwyer, 58 Wn.2d 576, 364 P.2d 521 (1961).
78 Terry v. King County, supra note 77.
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serving as an agent of the state and thereby was not affected by the
provision."0 But for this, the designation of the one county might
have been special legislation, not because only one county was affected
by the grant, but because there was no attempt at classification. That
only one municipal corporation is included in a class does not necessarily make it bad; that there is no attempt at classification, but
simply a designation of one municipal corporation, is violative of the
provision.
Article 2, section 28, subdivision 8 prohibits special legislation "For
incorporating any town or village or to amend the charter thereof."
Legislation incorporating towns and villages or amending the charters
thereof by special act was common prior to the adoption of the constitution. 0 By virtue of the constitutional provision, the legislature is
now required to act by general laws in such matters."' Note that the
clause applies to any "town or village." This has been held to mean
that cities are not included therein. The exact line between a town
or village on the one hand and a city on the other, for the purpose of
this provision, has not been drawn. It is clear that the provision does
not apply to a municipality having a population in excess of 100,000,
and it is likely that it has no application to any municipality having
more than 20,000 inhabitants.8 2
A comparable provision relating to cities is to be found, however, in
article 11, section 10, which provides in part that:
Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special
laws; but the legislature, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation, organization, and classification in proportion to population, of cities and towns, which laws may be altered, amended, or
repealed. Cities and towns heretofore organized or incorporated may
become organized under such general laws whenever a majority of
the electors voting at a general election shall so determine, and shall
organize in conformity therewith; and cities or towns heretofore or
hereafter organized and all charters thereof framed or adopted by
authority of this constitution shall be subject to and controlled by
general laws .... 83
This clause prevents the incorporation of cities and the amendment
of the charters thereof by special laws just as the preceding section
79 State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs v. Clausen, 95 Wash. 214, 163 Pac. 744 (1917).
Tacoma Land Co. v. Board of County Conn'rs, 1 Wash. 482, 25 Pac. 904 (1890).
1 Legislative provisions for incorporation proceedings are included in RCW ch.

80
8

35.02.
82

Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wn.2d 211, 163 P.2d 594 (1945).
The twelfth amendment to the state constitution authorizes the legislature, by general law, to classify counties by population for certain purposes.
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does as to towns and villages."4 It necessitates the enactment of general laws on the subject.85 It likewise prohibits specific legislative
designation of boundaries for municipalities though it does not prevent
the legislature from prescribing the procedure for determining the
boundaries of newly created municipalities."
One other provision of article 2, section 28 should be noted. Subdivision 10 prohibits special legislation, "Releasing or extinguishing in
whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability or other obligation, of any
person, or corporation to this state, or to any municipal corporation
therein." The subdivision's purpose is to prohibit favoring of any
debtor or group of debtors obligated to the state or any municipal
corporation. It protects taxpayers from legislative action designed to
shift to one group a disproportionate burden of taxation by releasing
or extinguishing, by special statutes, the tax obligations of a favored
group." While the immediate purpose is to protect the individual or
private corporation, this provision indirectly protects the municipal
corporation from a type of legislation which would interfere with
taxes and other indebtedness owing thereto.
Three types of problems remain which deserve individual attention.
In a few states local option legislation has been held to violate special
legislation limitations because some cities, or even one, might elect to
function thereunder, while other cities might decline.88 This argument
has not been accepted in Washington. The fact that all but a few, or
one city, might refuse to avail themselves of certain proffered powers
or privileges has not led to a finding of special legislation. So long as
the legislation is open to a reasonable class, that is sufficient.8" This
result is desirable, since to hold to the contrary would mean every law
with respect to municipal corporations would have to be mandatory;
municipal corporations could not be allowed to exercise their will in
determining which powers or privileges to exercise. There is no reason
to believe that the framers of the constitution had any such intention
in prohibiting special legislation.
A second area of concern and one which has created problems in
Washington is that of so-called closed-class legislation. As previously
Martin v. Tollefson, supra note 82.
General provisions for the incorporation of first class cities are set forth in RCW
ch. 35.03.
86 Port of Tacoma v. Parosa, 52 Wn.2d 181, 324 P.2d 438 (1958).
87 See State ex rel. Collier v. Yelle, 9 Wn2d 317, 115 P.2d 373 (1941).
88 See, for example, Appeal of Scranton School Dist., 113 Pa. 176, 6 At. 158 (1886).
89 State ex rel. Hunt v. Tausick, 64 Wash. 69, 116 Pac. 651 (1911) ; Municipality of
Metropolitan Seattle v. Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 446, 357 P.2d 863 (1960).
84
85
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discussed, the fact that only one or a few municipalities are included
in a class does not of itself make the classification bad. However, if
a class is defined in such a way as to preclude the possibility of any
other municipal corporation ever becoming a member of the class
favored or regulated, there is greater likelihood of a finding of special
legislation. This most often occurs when a class is defined in terms of
existing conditions or circumstances. Courts often regard as special
legislation, statutes which classify municipalities on the basis of conditions existing at the time of enactment and which make no provision for the entry of a municipality into a different class should conditions change in the future. Thus, while classification according to
population will generally be upheld if reasonable in view of the objective of the statute, it is probable that an act will be denominated
as special if applicable only to municipalities of a designated population on a designated date.
In Nicholls v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81," a statute forbade the
purchase of fuel for use in certain public institutions unless it was
mined or produced within the state of Washington. There was the
proviso that no institution which at the time of the passage of the act
was using fuel mined or produced outside the state was compelled to
comply if the cost of fuel produced within the state was over five per
cent greater than the cost of fuel produced outside the state. This was
held to be unconstitutional as the classification was fixed as of the date
when the law became effective with no provision for, or anticipation of,
future conditions. The court was unable to perceive any reasonable
basis for the classification since it meant, for example, that a school
district using outside coal for one day prior to the passage of the act
could continue to purchase that coal while another district which had
not used outside coal would be prohibited from doing so.
In another case a statute authorized the re-incorporation of municipal corporations which had originally incorporated under a statute
subsequently declared void by the court. The re-incorporation statute
was held to be unconstitutional as constituting the creation of municipal corporations by a special law."' The statute was deemed special
since it was applicable solely and exclusively to existing conditions.
Nothing was said about the reason for the classification or the peculiar
position in which the municipal corporations affected found themselves.
Similarly, a statute relating to cities having over 100,000 inhabitants
919195

Wash. 310, 80 P2d 833 (1938).
Town of Denver v. Spokane Falls, 7 Wash. 226, 34 Pac. 926 (1893).
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but not more than 150,000 "as shown by the 1940 census of the
United States" was held to be special legislation since it was based upon
certain existing conditions.2
In each of the above cases language exists suggesting that any time
a class is closed or based upon existing conditions it is thereby per se
bad. The cases should not be interpreted as having that meaning,
however, and if they were intended to say that, they are much too
strict. As with other special legislation, reasonableness should be the
test. If closing the class is reasonable in view of the objective sought
to be achieved by the legislation, there is no basis to declare it invalid.
The test is well illustrated by Rood v. Water Dist. No. 24 of King
County." In 1927 a 1913 statute permitting the organization of water
districts was held to violate the due process clause in that inhabitants
of the proposed districts were not given an opportunity to be heard
on the questions of the property to be included or the benefits to be
derived therefrom. In 1931 the legislature passed a curative act,
validating such water districts as had maintained their organization
since the date of their attempted incorporation under the 1913 act.
This was a closed class as it was based upon existing conditions and
could in no way be affected by what happened in the future. Nevertheless, the statute was sustained, the court stating that the class
affected was separate from all others. This is clearly correct. There
was a body of persons peculiarly in need of attention. The classification established by the legislature related to that need. There was
no reason to attempt to phrase the statute to apply to future conditions.
In short, the classification was reasonable in view of the different characteristics of the classes and the objective of the legislation. To apply
a strict rule, that a statute based upon existing conditions is per se
invalid, would have interfered unnecessarily with the legislature without furthering the objective of the special legislation clause. 4
92

Martin v. Tollefson, 24 Wn2d 211, 163 P.2d 594 (1945).

93 183 Wash. 258, 48 P.2d 584 (1935).

94 Other instances in which the court has sustained closed class legislation are Pullman v. Hungate, 8 Wash. 519, 36 Pac. 483 (1894), involving an act providing for the
legalization of cities and towns which had attempted to incorporate under earlier unconstitutional statutes, and Campbell v. State, 12 Wn.2d 459, 122 P.2d 458 (1942), involving a statute which forbade a person to conduct a dental office in his name unless he
was personally present therein a majority of the time, with the proviso that persons so
conducting a dental office at the time the act took effect might continue to do so. In
Baker v. Seattle, 2 Wash. 576, 27 Pac. 462 (1891) a statute empowering cities organized
prior to the adoption of the constitution to extend their credit and fund their indebtedness was held not to be special legislation in view of the fact that another act passed at
the same session gave like authority to cities organized after the constitution was
adopted. Instead of looking only to the individual statute, the court took a broader view
of inquiring into the total legislation enacted during the session. This supports the test
of reasonableness set forth in the text.
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A time limitation placed upon a statute can be the basis for a "special
legislation" argument. The Washington court has stated flatly that a
limitation on the duration of a legislative enactment does not make it
a special law.95 Just as some of the language by the court relating to
curative acts has been too strict, so this language is too broad. There
might be instances in which a time restriction upon an otherwise valid
general law would result in special legislation. The restriction might
become a characteristic of the classification and have no reasonable
relation to the purpose of the statute.9 Here again, the test should be
one of reasonableness in view of the two factors previously discussed.

Hokm

RuLE

Several states have further limited legislative supremacy over municipal corporations by adopting constitutional amendments designed
to allow certain municipalities to frame their own charters and thereby
determine their own powers with respect to local or municipal affairs."7
Constitutional home rule provisions are of three basic types, those
which authorize the legislature to enact statutes permitting the cities
to govern themselves, those which grant power to cities to adopt charters but require enactment of enabling legislation, and those which
authorize cities to adopt charters without the necessity of enabling
legislation. The effect of these provisions as sources of municipal power
and as limitations upon legislative control vary greatly among the
home rule states. Thus, determinations in one state as to the meaning
and effect of its provision must be viewed with considerable caution
elsewhere.
In most of the states the principal problem to be resolved is that of
delineating what constitutes a "state" affair and what a "local" or
"municipal" affair. In the former the legislature retains its supremacy.
In the latter, the municipal corporation may well be autonomous.
While there is the expected disagreement as to the definition of the
terms, there is general agreement that this is the determining factor.
In Washington there is no such problem of defining terms. For that
matter, there is no problem of home rule. This results from the par995 Wheeler School Dist. v. Hawley, 18 Wn2d 37, 137 P.2d 1010 (1943).

0 See the discussion in DeHart v. Atlantic City, 63 N.J.L. 223, 43 Atl. 742 (1899).
States with home rule provisions are Missouri (1875), California (1879), Washington (1889), Idaho (1890), Utah (1895), Minnesota (1896), Colorado (1902),
Oregon (1906), Oklahoma (1907), Michigan (1908), Texas (1909), Arizona (1910),
Nebraska (1912), Ohio (1912), Maryland (1915), Louisiana (1921), Pennsylvania
(1922), New York (1923), Nevada (1924), Wisconsin (1924), West Virginia (1935),
Georgia (1945), Rhode Island (1951), Tennessee (1953).
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ticular wording and interpretation of the Washington constitutional
provision.98
Article 10, section 11 provides that any city containing a population
of 20,000 inhabitants or more may frame a charter for its own government. The constitution then prescribes in considerable detail the
method by which this is to be done. The legislative authority of the
city is authorized to provide for an election of fifteen freeholders, who
shall have been residents of the city for at least two years and who
are qualified electors, to prepare a charter. The proposed charter is
then submitted to the electors of the city and if a majority voting
thereon ratify the same, it becomes the charter of the city. Charters
may be amended by means of proposals submitted by the legislative
authority of the city to the electors at an election at which a majority
of those voting thereon must approve.
For the most part the court has interpreted the means provided in
the constitutional provision for adopting and amending a charter in
such manner as to further the purpose of encouraging local self-rule
and to allow the inhabitants to adapt their charter to changing conditions of modern life. Thus it has been held that a charter may be
amended by a majority of those voting upon the proposition for
amendment rather than a majority of all voters voting at the election,
despite an apparent provision in a city charter to the contrary;" that
the state legislature may require the legislative authority of the city to
call an election to choose fifteen freeholders to prepare a charter, upon
a petition of a certain percentage of the electors;' and that the legislature may require the municipal authorities to submit to a vote of
the people a charter amendment when petitioned to do so by a certain
percentage of the voters of the city, thereby compelling the city to
incur the expense of the election.'
Each of these decisions has had
the effect of promoting the principle that the adoption of a charter or
an amendment thereto is an act of the people and not the corporate
authorities.
Article 11, section 10 also requires that a proposed charter or amendment thereto be published in two daily newspapers for at least thirty
days prior to the election. The court has been particularly strict in
99 See Brachtenbach, Home Rule in Washingto--At the Whim of the Legislature,
29 WASH. L. REv. 295 (1954) for a brief discussion of home rule powers and a detailed
analysis of proposed amendments to the Washington constitutional provision.
99 State ex rel. Wiesenthal v. Denny, 4 Wash. 135, 29 Pac. 991 (1892).
100 Reeves v. Anderson, 13 Wash. 17, 42 Pac. 625 (1895).
101 Hindman v. Boyd, 42 Wash. 17, 84 Pac. 609 (1906).
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interpreting this requirement to be mandatory." 2 In the most recent
case, involving an amendment to the Yakima city charter, publication
occurred for twenty-seven days prior to the election. In a 5-4 decision
the court held the election invalid and stated it was not at liberty to
substitute some other device which might be considered more effective."0 ' In two vigorous dissents it was contended that the legislature
could provide for a method of charter amendment different from that
in the constitution and that it was clear that the electorate of Yakima
was well informed about the election in view of the widespread publicity in all news media and the large number of persons voting. In
defense of the majority it may be said that its literal interpretation of
the constitutional notice requirement assures that a certain minimum
standard will always be met. If the local authorities wish to do more to
make the electorate aware of the effect of a proposed charter amendment, they may of course do so.
These decisions relating to the machinery by which charters are to
be adopted and amended have served to promote the concept of local
control over local affairs, which is the purpose of the home rule provision. This purpose has at times been broadly stated by the Washington court: "to secure to all such cities complete local self-government in municipal affairs;"'"° "to give to cities of the first class, having
the right to adopt their own charters, the fullest power in that respect; "I and to "recognize that large, growing cities should be empowered to determine for themselves, and in their own way, the many
important and complex questions of local policy which arise. " 10 This
policy has been implemented to the extent of establishing that the
inhabitants of a city containing a population of twenty thousand or
more have the right to frame a charter and that the legislature may
not prevent the exercise of that right. It has been said that, "There is
no qualification or reservation of this right."' 7
When one reaches the point of determining what may be included
in a charter, however, it is found that Washington parts company
from most home rule states. While the inhabitants of cities over
20,000 may have the right to frame a charter free from legislative cur102 Wade v. Tacoma, 4 Wash. 85, 29 Pac. 983 (1892) ; State ex rel. Linn v. Superior
Court, 20 Wn.2d 138, 146 P.2d 543 (1944).
103 Burns v. Alderson, 51 Wn.2d 810, 322 P2d 359 (1958).
104 Bussell v. Gill, 58 Wash. 468, 473, 108 Pac. 1080, 1083 (1910).
1o5 State ex rel. Hindley v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 352, 355, 126 Pac. 920, 921

(1912).
1O
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Hilzinger v. Gillman, 56 Wash. 228, 234, 105 Pac. 471, 474 (1909).
State ex rel. Billington v. Sinclair, 28 Wn2d 575, 583, 183 P.2d 813, 817 (1947).
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tailment, they have no right to be free from legislative control as to
the contents thereof. This results from the interpretation of the clause
in article 11, section 10 that a charter adopted by a city for its own
government shall be "consistent with and subject to the constitution
and laws of this state."
It was early established that the effect of this clause is to render
10 8
home rule cities completely subject to the laws of the legislature.
The court has consistently adhered to that position regardless whether
the matter regulated relates to purely state affairs, purely local affairs,
or a subject of joint interest to the state and municipal corporation.
Ordinances enacted by a city pursuant to charter provisions are subject
to the supremacy of any statutes in point and it matters not whether the
ordinances are promulgated by the legislative authority of the city
or by referendum of the people in accordance with the city's charter." 9
The doctrine of legislative supremacy applies not only to ordinances,
but to the provisions of the charter itself. 10
The meaning of the home rule provision as interpreted by the court is
well stated in the following:
This constitutional provision, while providing for home rule within a
city or town as to those matters which are local in character, does not
give to the municipality, under its charter, the right to legislate exclusively on all matters which touch its existence. By authorizing
municipal charters, the constitution does not take from the legislature
the right to determine what shall be the law of the state, both inside
and outside of municipalities."'Though the interpretation of the provision is literally correct, one
wonders whether it is realistically and politically correct. Why should
not a municipal corporation of the first class be permitted to regulate
its own local affairs, free from legislative control? Who is most familiar
with the local problems and needs? Who is most concerned with their
solution? Who is best qualified to determine the methods of resolving
the local problems? Over which body does the local electorate have
the most control? Until legislative reapportionment occurs on a statewide basis, and perhaps even thereafter, are not the legislators from
rural areas able to regulate the local affairs of the larger municipalities?
Are they qualified to do so, so far as understanding the problems?
Should they have the power to do so? Why provide for home rule
108 State ex rel. Seattle v. Carson, 6 Wash. 250, 33 Pac. 428 (1893).
109 Miller v. Spokane, 35 Wn.2d 113, 211 P.2d 165 (1949).

110 State ex rel. Lynch v. Fairley, 76 Wash. 332, 136 Pac. 374 (1913).
-1lMosebar v. Moore, 41 Wn.2d 216, 221, 248 P.2d 385, 388 (1952).
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cities in the constitution if they have no more power in relation to
their local affairs than do non-home rule cities in those instances in
which the legislature decides to act? Is it necessary that a constitutional clause requiring a charter to be "consistent with and subject to
the... laws of this state" be interpreted to apply to matters of solely
local concern as well as matters of solely state concern or of matters
of concern to both? Is it advisable so to interpret such a clause?
As indicated, all this is academic. The fact remains that in the
event of an inconsistency between a statute and a city charter or
ordinance, the statute controls. In certain areas the supreme interest
of the state is apparent as in the case of the creation of municipal or
police courts, it being for the legislature to create additional courts," 2
or the extension of the boundaries of a first-class city, in view of the
effect on surrounding areas,"' or the exercise of the power of eminent
domain."' In other areas there is a vital joint interest of both the state
and the municipal corporation, justifying state predominance in view
of the fundamental nature of our governmental structure. This is
illustrated by the power of municipalities to tax," 5 the issuance of
bonds to acquire public utilities,'16 and the grant of franchises to use
city streets."' Finally, there are instances in which the matter is clearly
of local concern. These include the recall of city councilmen,"' residence requirements for city employees, 119 the fixing of working conditions, wages and pensions for city employees, 2 9 the determination of
the time for presenting claims against the city,'2 ' the calling for comIn re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137, 27 Pac. 1064 (1891).
I's State ex rel. Snell v. Warner, 4 Wash. 773, 31 Pac. 25 (1892).
114 Tacoma v. State, 4 Wash. 64, 29 Pac. 847 (1892).
115 Great No. Ry. v. Glover, 194 Wash. 146, 77 P.2d 598 (1938); State ex rel.
Seattle v. Carson, 6 Wash. 250, 33 Pac. 428 (1893).
110 Shorts v. Seattle, 95 Wash. 538, 164 Pac. 241 (1917).
11" Much litigation has arisen in this field and in each instance the statute has been
held to prevail over the charter, regardless of the nature of the issue involved. See
Benton v. Seattle Elec. Co., 50 Wash. 156, 96 Pac. 1033 (1908) (charter provision
requiring vote of people before grant of franchise, held invalid) ; Ewing v. Seattle, 55
Wash. 229, 104 Pac. 259 (1909) (charter provision requiring franchises to be sold at
public auction to highest bidder, held invalid) ; State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court,
67 Wash. 37, 120 Pac. 861 (1912) (statute authorizing state public service commission
to fix rates for public service corporations, held to prevail over charter setting rates for
telegraph company operating under franchise from city) ; Dolan v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 72 Wash. 343, 130 Pac. 353 (1913) (charter provision making
an ordinance granting a street railway franchise subject to a referendum vote of the
people, held invalid). See also State ex rel. Harlin v. Superior Court, 139 Wash. 282,
247 Pac. 4 (1926) and Neils v. Seattle, 185 Wash. 269, 53 P.2d 848 (1936).
118 Hilzinger v. Gillman, 56 Wash. 228, 105 Pac. 471 (1909) ; State ex rel. Lynch v.
Fairley, 76 Wash. 332, 136 Pac. 374 (1913).
119 Mosebar v. Moore, 41 Wn2d 216, 248 P.2d 385 (1952).
120 State ex rel. Everett Fire Fighters v. Johnson, 46 Wn2d 114,278 P.2d 662 (1955).
121 Scurry v. Seattle, 8 Wash. 278, 36 Pac. 145 (1894) ; Young v. Seattle, 30 Wn2d
357, 191 P.2d 273 (1948).
112
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petitive bids in conjunction with the operation of a municipally-owned
transportation system,122 and the establishment of crematories within
the city limits.12 In many home rule states the nature of the matters
regulated would justify local control despite any statutes to the contrary. In Washington, in each instance the statute in point was held
to prevail.
The supremacy of the legislature in Washington has also been maintained in two other comparable situations. The twenty-first amendment
authorizes any county to frame a home rule charter "subject to the
Constitution and laws of this state." The twenty-third amendment
provides for the creation of combined city and county municipal
corporations. Any such combined city and county has all rights, powers
and privileges asserted in the charter, "not inconsistent with general
laws." It is to be expected that these amendments will be interpreted
in the same manner as the home rule provision of article 11, section 10.
Though the traditional state-local dichotomy has no place in Washington home rule matters in those instances in which a statute exists,
such a distinction is important at other times, though not clearly
enunciated by the court. There have been occasions upon which the
court has spoken to the effect that home rule cities derive no powers
from the constitution itself but that their powers are entirely dependent
upon delegation from the legislature. As an example, in reference to
home rule cities, the court has said, "But we must not lose sight of the
elementary proposition that municipal corporations have only the
powers which are specially conferred upon them by the legislature, or
such other powers as by necessary implication flow therefrom."' 24
Such language is appropriate to non-home rule cities, but not to
home rule cities deriving their powers from the constitution as is true
in Washington. To treat home rule cities in this manner is to say
they have no more powers than non-home rule cities and is to completely eliminate the effect of article 11, section 10. It is one thing
to conclude that the legislature is supreme in all instances in which
its acts conflict with a city charter. As noted, even that goes far
beyond most home rule states. It is much more to say that every
provision in a charter, to be effective, must be founded upon some
power conferred by an act of the legislature.
A major purpose of the home rule doctrine is to free the locality
122
123
124

Dalton v. Clarke, 18 Wn.2d 322, 139 P.2d 291 (1943).
Oakwood Co. v. Tacoma Mausoleum Ass'n, 22 Wn.2d 692, 157 P.2d 595 (1945).
State ex rel. Fawcett v. Superior Court, 14 Wash. 604, 606, 45 Pac. 23,24 (1896).
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from legislative control over local affairs. That objective has not been
achieved in Washington, as discussed. Certainly, however, there is no
reason to conclude that a locality should not be free to run its local
affairs when the legislature has said nothing. To require the municipality to wait until the legislature speaks would in many instances
mean that certain areas would never be subject to regulation or only
long delayed regulation. While such delay may be necessary with
non-home rule cities, since without legislation there is no authority to
act, there is absolutely no reason for delay in the case of the larger
cities since the constitution authorizes action to be taken.
Further, the legislature would have the power without any constitutional provision to authorize cities to adopt charters for themselves.
Unless the provision is interpreted to mean that the cities named
therein have the power to frame their own charters and determine the
contents thereof as to their local affairs, except in the event of an
inconsistency with a statute, the provision is an idle ceremony without
any force whatsoever. It is not reasonable so to interpret article 11,
section 10.125
How then is one to explain the language in some of the cases suggesting that home rule cities derive no power directly from the constitution? It is to be noted that such language has been used by the
court in those instances in which the mater in question has involved
a subject either of sole state concern or of joint concern to the state
and the municipal corporation. Thus, in the case quoted above, the
question was one of whether a municipal corporation could confer
jurisdiction on a superior court to hear a contested election case. 2 '
Clearly the matter of the jurisdiction of the superior courts of the
state is to be determined by the state legislature rather than any
particular city within which the court sits. Other instances in which
the court has spoken in terms of the municipal corporation not being
able to act because of a lack of delegated power from the legislature
include the creation of courts,"" the matter of annexation and the determination of municipal boundaries,'2 8 the exercise of the eminent
1.25 See dissenting opinion of Hoyt, C. J., in State ex rel. Fawcett v. Superior Court,
14 Wash. 604, 45 Pac. 23 (1896).
126 State ex rel. Fawcett v. Superior Court, supra note 124. The same principle was
later applied in State ex rel. Navin v. Weir, 26 Wash. 501, 67 Pac. 226 (1901) when a
charter purported to confer jurisdiction upon the city council to decide contested election cases. While the city has a vital interest in its own elections, the determination
of a contest thereof can be seen as a matter of state-wide interest, just as any other
determination
requiring the decision of an impartial body.
27
L In re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137, 27 Pac. 1064 (1891).
128 State ex tel. Snell v. Warner, 4 Wash. 773, 31 Pac. 25 (1892).
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domain power,"' and the exercise by a municipal corporation of the
power to grant franchises.'
It is to be noted that in each instance the
interest of the state was paramount or joint with that of the municipal
corporation. In those instances in which the matter has been one of
solely local concern, the court has spoken only in terms of whether
there is an inconsistency, not whether there has been a delegation of
power by the legislature.
The conclusion to be drawn is that in Washington a home rule
city is subordinate to the legislature as to any matter upon which the
legislature has acted, whether it be regarded as of state, local, or joint
concern. In the event of an inconsistency, the statute prevails. However, in those instances in which the legislature has said nothing, an
analysis of interests is vital. If the subject is of paramount state
concern, some delegation of power by the legislature, express or implied, to the municipal corporation must be found. This is likewise
true in those instances in which there is a joint state-local problem.
Since the state will be affected by any action of the municipal corporation, it is necessary that an authorization to act from the legislature
be found. In those instances in which the matter is solely of local
interest, however, home rule cities may act without a delegation from
the legislature, express or implied.'' To that extent the home rule
provision is self-executing. Any other interpretation leaves the provision without meaning, and unless and until the court clearly decides
to the contrary, there is no reason to expect such treatment.
POWERS OF MUNICIPALTIES

It is necessary to distinguish the classes of cities in Washington in
order to discuss the approach taken by the court to the general powers
of municipal corporations. It is to be noted initially that what is said
immediately hereafter does not apply to the police power or the power
of eminent domain. Because of their peculiar nature, they will be
treated separately later.
In accordance with the constitutional directive in article 11, section
10, the legislature has classified cities in proportion to population.
129 Tacoma v. State, 4 Wash. 64, 29 Pac. 847 (1892).

Neils v. Seattle, 185 Wash. 269, 53 P.2d 848 (1936).
131 See Malette v. Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 225, 137 Pac. 496, 504 (1913) wherein the
court said "As to matters of local concern, wider powers than those conferred upon
cities of the first class by the constitution and law of this state can hardly be conceived.
It seems plain, therefore, that unless the ordinance in question is contrary to some
public policy of the state, either expressed by statute or implied therefrom, it must be
held valid."
130
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First class cities include those having at least twenty thousand inhabitants at the time of organization or reorganization; second class,
ten thousand; third class, fifteen hundred; and fourth class, three
hundred." 2
It is a common-place statement that municipal corporations possess
only those powers expressly enumerated by statute, those necessarily
or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted and
those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation." 3 It is to be noted that this refers to cities of the second, third
and fourth classes, those under a population of twenty thousand. In
effectuating the general proposition of the necessity of legislative
authorization, the legislature has prescribed in considerable detail the
powers of each class. 3" Further restricting municipal powers is the
doctrine that such statutes granting powers are strictly construed and
any doubt is resolved against the municipality.3 5
To be contrasted with this strict approach is the construction of
powers of cities of the first class. It has been said that, "Manifestly,
a different rule of construction must be applied in determining the
powers of a city of the first class from that used when the powers of
a city of another classification are in question."'3 6 Such cities have
legislative powers as broad as the state unless they contravene a constitutional provision, an act of the legislature or a provision of the
city charter."' Thus it is unnecessary to find the same enumeration of
powers in statutes as is true with second, third and fourth class cities.'3 8
132 RCW ch. 35.01.
'33 State ex rel. Winsor

v. Mayor and Common Council, 10 Wash. 4, 38 Pac. 761
(1894) ; State ex rel. Huggins v. Bridges, 97 Wash. 553, 166 Pac. 780 (1917) ; Christie
v. Port of Olympia, 27 Wn.2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947).
31 RCW ch. 35.23, second class cities; RCW ch. 3524, third class cities; RCW
ch. 35.27, fourth class cities or towns. In one instance the form of government under
which a city is organized determines which laws are applicable. Regardless of classification, cities organized under the statutory commission form of government have all
the powers of cities of the second class. They are governed by the statutes applicable
to cities of the second class to the extent they are appropriate and not in conflict with
provisions specifically applicable to cities organized under the commission form. See
RCW 35.17.030.
'35 State ex rel. Hill v. Bridges, 87 Wash. 260, 151 Pac. 490 (1915); State e.x rel.
Hill v. Port of Seattle, 104 Wash. 634, 177 Pac. 671, 180 Pac. 137 (1919) ; Griggs v.
Port of Tacoma, 150 Wash. 402, 273 Pac. 521 (1928) ; Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Pierce County, 27 Wn2d 347, 178 P2d 351 (1947).
136 State ev rel. Ennis v. Superior Court, 153 Wash. 139, 149, 279 Pac. 601, 604
(1929).
137 Winkenwerder v. Yakima, 52 Wn.2d 617, 328 P.2d 873 (1958).
139 RCW ch. 35.22 relates to first class cities. In particular RCW 35.22.570 provides
as follows: "Any city adopting a charter under the provisions of this chapter shall have
all the powers which are conferred upon incorporated cities and towns by this title or
other laws of the state, and all such powers as are usually exercised by municipal
corporations of like character and degree."
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The broad construction of powers of first class cities is well illustrated by Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima."' The court held that
Yakima, a city of the first class, could contract with a private business,
allowing such business to use the tops of city parking meters for advertising purposes. Instead of approaching the matter from the standpoint of seeking a constitutional or statutory authorization for the
exercise of such power, as would be true with second, third, and fourth
class cities, the court considered whether the power to pass such an
ordinance was denied by the state constitution, an act of the legislature
or the city charter. Finding that it was not, the ordinance was
sustained.
Buttressing this broad construction of powers of first class cities is
the rule that insofar as statutes relate to such cities they will be
liberally interpreted. The rule of resolving doubts against municipalities does not apply to those of the first class.14 ° This is of particular consequence when a statute grants power to a charter city on
a matter of primary state concern or of joint state-local concern, as
discussed in the preceding section on home rule.
The power of eminent domain requires separate mention. Here there
is not the same necessity of distinguishing between classes, since the
court gives a limited construction to the municipal eminent domain
power, regardless of the class of city involved. The power can arise
only from express grant or clear implication, and doubts will be resolved against the existence of the power. As there is no constitutional
provision granting the power to municipalities, municipal corporations
are dependent upon legislative grant. 4 '
An excellent illustration of the strict construction is an early case in
which the Tacoma city charter provided a method for the condemna139 Supra note 137. The case is commented upon in 34 WASH. L. Rav. 227 (1959).
140 Ayers v. Tacoma, 6 Wn.2d 545, 108 P.2d 348 (1940); State ex rel. Ennis v.
Superior Court, 153 Wash. 139, 279 Pac. 601 (1929).
141 Gasaway v. Seattle, 52 Wash. 444, 100 Pac. 991 (1909) ; Tepley v. Sumerlin, 46
Wn.2d 504, 282 P.2d 827 (1955). In addition to the state legislature delegating the
power of eminent domain to its municipal corporations, there is the possibility of delegation of the federal eminent domain power to a municipality. For example, Congress
in authorizing a municipality to make an improvement in connection with navigable
waters may invest the municipality with the eminent domain power. City of Davenport
v. Three-fifths of an Acre of Land, 147 F.Supp. 794 (D.C. Ill., 1957). In Washington
the litigation in this area has primarily concerned the power of the Federal Power
Commission in exercising its authority over navigable waters of the United States to
grant a permit to a municipality authorizing the construction of hydroelectric dams and
in aid of this purpose to delegate the federal eminent domain power to the municipality.
See State of Washington Dep't of Game v. Federal Power Commission, 207 F.2d 391
(9th Cir. 1953) ; City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 49 Wn.2d 781, 307 P.2d
567 (1957), reversed in 357 U.S. 320 (1958). The litigation is discussed in 33 WASH.
L. REv. 117 (1958).
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tion of private property for use as a public street and a statute conferred authority upon charter cities to appropriate private property
for corporate purposes. 42 The court held that this did not justify
the exercise of the power of eminent domain as the statute could be
construed to mean that the city was only authorized to purchase the
land, not condemn it. The case is striking for several reasons. First,
it appeared that the legislature had intended to provide explicitly for
the power of eminent domain but had failed to get around to the
matter because of its work in reorganizing the state government.
Second, the effect of the decision was to leave the cities without the
power to condemn for the vital purpose of public streets. Third, a
charter city was involved. The court stated,
[T]he exercise of the power of eminent domain is so high and
peculiar a thing that nothing less than an act of the legislature of a
state can support it, and that act must not only confer the power, but
prescribe the method by which it is to be done. . . . Because the constitution permits certain cities to frame charters for their own government is no sufficient reason for their assuming a branch of the
sovereignty of the state, which has no element of municipal government in it, and the provisions of the charter must therefore be held
void. 43
Also requiring separate attention are the police powers of municipalities. Here as with the power of eminent domain, all classes of
cities are treated basically alike. However, whereas in the case of the
power of eminent domain no city may act without legislative authorization, in the case of police powers, all cities derive authority directly
from the constitution."" Article 11, section 11 provides, "Any county,
city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such
local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with
general laws." This clause raises two matters requiring special treatment. What is the meaning of the phrase "within its limits"? What
construction is to be given to the phrase "not in conflict with general
laws"?
EXTpATERRITORIAL POWERS

It is a general principle that a municipal corporation cannot exercise
powers beyond its own limits, except as such authority may be derived
"42Tacoma v. State, 4 Wash. 64, 29 Pac. 847 (1892).
"43 Supra note 140 at 66, 29 Pac. 847 (1892).
44 Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177, 206 Pac. 976 (1922) ; Patton
v. Bellingham, 179 Wash. 566, 38 P2d 364 (1934).
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from a statute which expressly or impliedly permits it.'4 5 Statutes relating to the exercise of extraterritorial powers are strictly construed."'
Thus, it has been held that a statute authorizing cities to furnish water
to the city and the inhabitants thereof "and any other persons" is to
be construed to mean other persons of the same class; i.e., persons
within, and not persons without, the corporate limits."'
If, however, it is made clear that the extraterritorial exercise of
powers is intended, a city may so act. An express provision for the
sale of excess water outside the city 4 8 and an implied power to sell
surplus electric energy for use outside the territorial limits... have been
sustained. A common instance in which cities have been authorized to
act beyond their boundaries and in which the court has allowed the
delegation has been that of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain."' It has even been held that under a statute granting cities
the power to acquire waterworks within or without the corporate
limits, a city has power to acquire and own property situated in another
state, upon consent of that state, for the purpose of making extensions
and betterments to its waterworks system. 5'
In most states the exercise of the police powers extraterritorially is
treated the same as other powers. Although such exercise of power is
not allowed without delegation, express legislative authorization is
sufficient. Initially one would expect the same in Washington, for, as
has been noted, in spite of the strict approach to the power of eminent
domain in this state, if expressly provided for, that power may be
exercised by municipal corporations outside their boundaries.
As to police powers, however, Washington is in a peculiar position
because of the landmark case of Brown v. Cle Elum. 52 A statute expressly authorized a municipal corporation to pass ordinances to
protect the city's water supply whether inside or outside the city limits
and to provide a penalty for the pollution, obstruction, or interference
therewith. The city of Cle Elum enacted an ordinance prohibiting
swimming, fishing and boating in a lake outside the city from which it
drew its water supply.
145 Edmonds Land Co. v. City of Edmonds, 66 Wash. 201, 119 Pac. 192 (1911).

146 State ex rel. P.U.D. No. 1 of Skagit County v. Wylie, 28 Wn.2d 113, 182 P.2d
706 (1947).
147 Farwell v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 141, 86 Pac. 217 (1906).
148 Spear v. City of Bremerton, 90 Wash. 507, 156 Pac. 825 (1916).
149 Municipal League of Bremerton v. Tacoma, 166 Wash. 82, 6 P.2d 587 (1931).
150 See RCW 8.12.030 and Carstens v. P.U.D. No. 1 of Lincoln County, 8 Wn.2d
136, 111 P.2d 583 (1941).
151 Langdon v. Walla Walla, 112 Wash. 446, 193 Pac. 1 (1920).
152 145 Wash. 588, 261 Pac. 112 (1927).
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In most states the ordinance would be valid because it rested upon
express statutory authorization. The Washington court, however, held
the ordinance unconstitutional as violative of article 11, section 11,
which provides for the exercise of the police power by a city "within
its limits." Judge Fullerton in a compelling dissenting opinion argued
that the constitution meant only that a municipal corporation could
exercise the police power within its limits, subject to any contrary
general law, without legislative authorization; it was not intended to
restrict the powers of the state legislature.
There is some language at the end of the majority opinion suggesting
that the decision relates only to ordinances of a penal nature. "[W] ithout a constitutional amendment, penal ordinances such as the one
under consideration here cannot be given extraterritorial effect."' 53
The difficulty is that the majority relied upon article 11, section 11,
which says nothing about penal ordinances, but speaks only of the
police power, and throughout the remainder of the opinion the court
spoke in terms of the exercise of the police power. "This delegation
of its police power by the state [in article 11, section 11] to various
municipalities is strictly limited to the exercise of that power within
the limits of such municipalities."' 54 (Emphasis added, in part).
As a result of this case, in Washington the police power cannot be
exercised beyond the corporate limits of a municipality even with express statutory authorization. The effect of this is far-reaching. As
an example, in some states the legislatures have authorized cities to
zone areas immediately surrounding the cities in order to protect the
public within. It seems that this is not possible in Washington, since
zoning is an exercise of the police power and under the Brown case,
the legislature cannot authorize extraterritorial exertion of such power.
Likewise, licensing for regulation purposes is restricted to the city
limits since this is an exercise of the police power.' 5 5 Doubt is also
cast upon the constitutionality of other legislative provisions, such as
the sanction of hot or fresh pursuit by cities of the third class 5 ' and
first class,' 57 the adoption of all needful rules, regulations and ordinances for the management, government and use of municipal airport
properties under a city's control, "whether within or without the terri1534 145 Wash. at 591, 261 Pac. at 113 (1927).
'51 Id. at 589, 261 Pac. at 112 (1927).
155 See Bungalow Amusement Co. v. Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 488, 269 Pac. 1043,
1044 (1928), wherein the court spoke of the police power of cities within a licensing
setting as being comparable to that of the state "within their territorial boundaries."
156 RCW 3524.160.
157 RCW 35.22.570.
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torial limits of the municipality," ' and the extension of the powers
and jurisdiction of all incorporated cities and towns to the middle of
navigable waters adjacent to such cities and towns "for every purpose
that such powers and jurisdiction could be exercised if the waters were
within the city or town limits.' 59 In short, any time a city is authorized or purports to exercise the police power outside its limits, it is
unconstitutional under the Brown doctrine.'
One point is to be distinguished. In view of the continual increase
in the number of municipalities, with the resultant overlapping of
boundaries, it is possible that more than one might be functioning in
a given geographical area. The rule against extraterritorial powers
does not render a statute unconstitutional merely because it permits
two or more municipalities to exercise the same phase of the police
powers in the same area.'
To the contrary, so long as each is operating within its own boundaries, the requirement of the Brown case
has been met.
CONFLICT

The second phrase of article 11, section 11 of particular significance
is the one that allows for police regulations "as are not in conflict with
general laws." This makes explicit with respect to the police powers
what is true by judicial determination of all powers of municipal
corporations in this state. Subject to the constitutional limitations
upon the legislature previously noted, the legislature is free to impose
limitations upon municipal corporations. This is true of home rule
cities as well as those deriving their powers directly from the legislature. Even the broad powers of first class cities cannot contravene
a legislative enactment. In short, in Washington a statute always
supersedes a conflicting ordinance. It thus becomes critical to ascertain
when a statute and ordinance will be deemed to be in conflict.
Sometimes the legislature expressly states in the pertinent statute
158 RCW 14.08.120.
159 RCW 35.21.160.
160 See TU-TLE, THE LOCAL LAW MAKING PowER, 11-12. This is a mimeographed
paper comprising part of the outlines of a continuing legal education series entitled
"Municipal Law and Your Clients," 1960, available in the law library, University of
Washington.
161 Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle v. Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 446, 357 P.2d 863
(1960). The court has indicated, however, that it generally approves the proposition
that two municipal corporations should not be found to have been empowered to exercise the same function in the same territory at the same time. The public policy
against duplication of public functions normally requires statutory authorization if there
is to be duplication and such authorization is examined closely. Aldervood Water Dist.
v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 162 Wash. Dec. 314, 382 P.2d 639 (1963).
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whether it intends to limit the power of the municipal corporation to
legislate on the same subject. In such instances the problem is lessened.
If further regulation is expressly allowed, an ordinance will b,9sustamed, barring an actual conflict with the statute." If the statute
expressly prohibits further regulation, an ordinance will fall-regardless
of any actual conflict.'
The more likely situation is that in which there is a legislative enactment upon a subject, but no express indication of whether further
action by the mumcipal corporation is precluded. If the city enacts an
ordinance directly contrary to the statute, as by permitting that which
is expressly prohibited by statute or by prohibiting that which is expressly allowed by statute, the ordinance will fall 64
There are a few cases suggesting that any time the legislature has
acted upon a subject, it has thereby pre-empted the field, and any
additional municipal rgulation is invalid even though not in direct
conflict with the statute. These cases should be restricted to their
particular facts. In Seattle Elec. Co. v. Seattle,'6 5 it was held that the
enactment of a statute empowering the state public-service commission
to regulate and control street railways precluded the city of Seattle
from regulating street cars. The court spoke in terms of the state
having occupied the field. It is to be noted that the statute involved
a broad delegation of power to a separate state agency to control street
railways. Ordinarily statutes regulating local activities are not drafted
in such comprehensive terms as to remove an entire area from the
control of the municipality In another instance the court spoke of
municipal corporations being free to exercise the police power "until
such time as the state acts."' 65 This can be. interpreted to mean that
once the state enters an area, all mumcipal regulations fall. But, again,
the case involved a situation in which a statute authorized an agency,
the state public service commission, to control a broad area, the estabAllen v. Bellingham, 95 Wash. 12, 163 Pac. 18 (1917).
16 Van Der Creek v. Spokane, 78 Wash. 94, 138 Pac. 560 (1914).
1 4Inthe following cases the ordinance was held invalid. Yakima v. Gorham, 200
Wash. 564, 94 P.2d 180 (1939), an ordinance prohibiting peaceful picketing was opposed
to the purpose of a state act permitting peaceful picketing; City of Airway Heights v.
Schroeder, 53 Wn.2d 625, 335 P2d 578 (1959), an ordinance modifying the speed limit
on a state highway which passed through a town was invalid because approval of the
state highway commission had not been secured as expressly required by statute; Fazio
v. Eglitis, 54 Wn2d 699, 344 P2d 521 (1959), an ordinance requiring a vehicle to stop
witlun fifteen feet of the curb lines of an arterial was held invalid because of a conflict
with a statute requiring a stop at the entrance to the intersection.
165 78 Wash. 203, 138 Pac. 892 (1914).
166 State ex rel. Webster v. Superior Court, 67 Wash. 37, 46, 120 Pac. 861, 865
(1912).
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lishment of rates and charges for public service corporations. The
opinion should be read in light of that fact.
One other early case requiring comment because of the possible
misinterpretation of its meaning is Tacoma Gas & Elec. Light Co. v.
Tacoma.'6 7 A statute authorized cities to provide for lighting the
streets and furnishing the inhabitants with gas or other light "and to
regulate and control the use thereof."' 68 A city charter provision
authorizing the enactment of ordinances fixing the price of gas was
held invalid. This was an instance in which a general law had been
enacted on a subject, but in which it was silent on the particular point.
It was an instance in which there was no direct conflict and no comprehensive scheme of regulation. The case could be interpreted as an
application of the pre-emption doctrine. A better explanation is that
it simply illustrates a judicial unwillingness to allow municipal price
fixing without specific delegation of such power.' 69
Rather than adopt the proposition that an entry of the state into a
field precludes further municipal action, the court has more often approached the problem with the objective of harmonizing the pertinent
state and local regulations. 7 ' The court has sustained a charter provision which prescribed qualifications for city officers in addition to
those required by statute,1 ' an ordinance which imposed restrictions
upon parking in addition to those specified by statute,'72 an ordinance
which prohibited the keeping open of theaters on Sunday when a
statute prohibited other activities but made no mention of theaters,'7 3
an ordinance fixing the speed limit at less than that prescribed by
statute,'74 an ordinance prohibiting the sale of cigarettes through automatic vending machines when a statute existed prohibiting the sale of
tobacco to minors,"' an ordinance which fixed a minimum penalty for
the punishment of an offense for which a statute prescribed a maximum
penalty,7 6 and an ordinance prohibiting the discharge of an air gun
Wash. 288, 44 Pac. 655 (1896).
168 14 Wash. at 293, 44 Pac. at 656 (1896).
169 Municipal price-fixing is often looked upon with disfavor barring an express
167 14

grant of such power. See

STASON AND KAUPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 212 (3rd ed. 1959).
170 McGill v. Hedges, 62 Wash. 274, 113 Pac. 635 (1911) ; Seattle v. Hewetson, 95

Wash. 612, 164 Pac. 234 (1917).
171 State ex rel. Griffiths v. Superior Court, 177 Wash. 619, 33 P.2d 94 (1934).
i72 Kimmel v. Spokane, 7 Wn.2d 372, 109 P.2d 1069 (1941).
173 In re Ferguson, 80 Wash. 102, 141 Pac. 322 (1914).
174 Bellingham v. Cissna, 44 Wash. 397, 87 Pac. 481 (1906).
375 Brennan v. Seattle, 151 Wash. 665, 276 Pac. 886 (1929).
176 Seattle v. Chin Let, 19 Wash. 38, 52 Pac. 324 (1898).
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or firearm without lawful authority though a statute already prohibited
the wilful discharge of firearms. 7
In numerous instances the court has in effect rejected the preemption doctrine in favor of the proposition that a city is not precluded
from acting in an area simply because there is a prior statute relating
to the subject matter. This is the proper approach. A city should be
free to act so long as it does not come into actual conflict with a
statute. If the legislature is silent on a particular point, the city should
be allowed to regulate even though a statute already exists in the
general area. If the city charter or ordinance is contrary to what the
legislature desires, it may expressly repeal or amend the city's action.
It is true that the matter can be approached from the opposite
side, namely that if the legislature intends for a city to have certain
powers in a given area regulated by statute, it can so specify. The
difficulty with this is that the legislature meets only periodically and
cannot possibly foresee all the problems which may require regulation.
To conclude that simply because the legislature has spoken in an area,
all further municipal action is foreclosed unless there is express legislative authorization would unnecessarily interfere with newly proposed
solutions to newly arising problems. On the other hand, if the municipality oversteps the legislative intent, the matter will undoubtedly
be called to the attention of the legislature at a later date by those
affected.
Such an approach in favor of the municipality does not unfairly
treat the private parties regulated or the interests of the state. So far
as private persons are concerned, it is to be remembered that all other
attacks upon municipal ordinances, whether of a constitutional or
statutory nature, are still available. The only thing being said is that
a conflict should not be found unless it truly exists.
The purpose of the constitutional provision precluding local regulations in conflict with statutes is to assure the supremacy of the
legislature. That supremacy is maintained even though the approach
is in favor of the municipality on the conflict issue. The legislature can
expressly make its wishes known if it does not want the municipality
to act in a particular manner or if the court misconstrues the legislative intent. A construction against the municipality which is erroneous is less likely to be rectified. It would have the effect of
interfering with the functioning of local government without any
equivalent benefit to private parties or the state.
177
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Two cases illustrate the proper approach to the conflict issue. In
Bellingham v. Schampera"' the defendant was charged and convicted
in the Bellingham police court of driving while under the influence of
intoxicants in violation of a city ordinance that was substantially
similar to a statute. The court held that since the statute did not
indicate an intent that it should be exclusive and since there was no
actual conflict, the ordinance prohibiting driving while under the influence was valid. It was also contended that the city of Bellingham
had no authority to provide for the suspension of a motor vehicle
license. The opinion, sustaining the argument, is ambiguous as to
whether the ordinance was invalid because of pre-emption by the state
or simply because of a lack of delegated power to the city. It appears
the latter is the true basis." 9 Interpreted in this manner, as it should
be, the opinion does not detract from the suggested approach that an
ordinance should be held invalid only when there is an actual conflict.
The most recent case in point is Seattle v. Long,' in which the defendant was charged in a municipal court with violation of an ordinance prohibiting operation of a motor vehicle without having in his
possession a valid driver's license. The defendant contended that inasmuch as a statute existed to the same effect, the state had pre-empted
the field. The court concluded that since the statute did not state that
it was intended to be exclusive and since there was no actual conflict,
the ordinance was valid. The result of this decision is to give full
effect to the interests of the local government without impinging upon
the supremacy of the state or violating any private right relating to
the conflict point.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been to outline the relation of municipal corporations to the legislature in Washington. Subject to a few
constitutional provisions, such as those relating to taxation and special
legislation, the legislature is free to act as it desires with respect to
municipalities. The home rule provision, which in some states serves
as a limitation on legislative action, is of no real strength in this state.
It is now too late to alter the home rule status of cities without a constitutional amendment. It is not too late, however, for the court to
continue, and to strengthen, its interpretations in favor of the powers
178
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questions whether the court's

interpretation of the pertinent statutes on the delegation point is the correct one.
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of first class cities when doubt exists and in favor of all municipal
corporations when an issue of potential conflict with state statutes

arises.
So far as the state-local relationship is concerned, the legislature has
ample opportunity to make its wishes known and to protect its prerogatives in relation to municipalities. In those instances in which
there is doubt as to legislative intent, and m .which there is a local
interest in the matter in question, the court's approach should be that
of giving the fullest opportunity to the local .government to resolve
problems as it sees them and to effectuate its policies.

